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According to the Communications Decency Act of 1996, a provider of an
interactive computer service cannot be held liable for publishing a
defamatory statement made by another party. In addition, the service
provider cannot be held liable for refusing to remove the statement from its
service. This article postulates that such immunity from producer and
distributor liability is a suspect public policy, and argues that the statute
should be amended to include a broad definition of “development” and a
“take-down and put-back” provision.

INTRODUCTION
¶1

The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”) should be amended to include a broad definition

of “development” and a “take-down and put-back” provision. In the twenty-first century, sixteen percent of
Americans have broadband Internet access in their homes,2 ninety-five percent of libraries provide Internet
access to their patrons,3 and seventy-seven percent of elementary and secondary schools provide Internet
access to their students.4 In addition, it is estimated that the percentage of American adults who use the
Internet more than tripled from 1996 to 2002.5 Despite these developments, Congress has yet to amend the
CDA, which endows a provider of an interactive computer service with immunity from publisher and
distributor tort liability. Under the statute, the service provider may select and publish a defamatory statement
made by another party and may refuse to remove the statement from its service even after it knows that the
statement is false. Conversely, under the common law, a provider of a traditional information service is liable
if it publishes or distributes defamatory material. This distinction between e-providers and traditional
providers is suspect because it is inherently based on an outdated policy decision.
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THE COMMON LAW TORT OF DEFAMATION
¶2

The common law tort of defamation provides a legal remedy to those injured by gossip. Specifically,

an individual is subject to liability if he or she damages another person’s reputation by speaking or publishing
false statements about that person to a third party.6 Defamatory statements have the potential to tarnish a
person’s morality or integrity, or even to discredit a person’s financial standing in the community.7 A person
found guilty of making a defamatory statement is assessed the monetary value of the harm caused by his or
her statement.8 In addition, the plaintiff in a defamation action has the burden of proving the elements of the
tort.9
¶3

An entity that publishes or distributes a defamatory statement made by another person is also liable.10

An entity, such as a newspaper, that repeats or otherwise republishes a defamatory statement is subject to
publisher liability because the injured party is harmed every time the statement is repeated.11 However, an
entity, such as a bookstore, that only distributes or transmits a defamatory statement, is subject to distributor
liability only if the entity knew or should have known that the statement was defamatory.12 A distributor
“should know” that a statement is defamatory if “a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence or of the
superior intelligence of the [distributor] would ascertain [the nature of the statement].”13

THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT OF 1996
¶4

The CDA was created in large part to protect children from objectionable online material.14 In

Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,15 Prodigy was held liable for publishing defamatory
statements on one of its online bulletin boards;16 the statements were placed on the board by one of Prodigy’s
customers.17 The court reasoned that Prodigy was the publisher of all statements made on the bulletin board
because Prodigy frequently monitored the information on the service and removed offensive material.18 This
holding concerned Congress. They worried that such a rule would deter a provider of an interactive computer
service from removing objectionable material from its services that are frequented by minors because
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removing the material would subject the service provider to publisher liability.19 In response, Congress
enacted 47 U.S.C. § 23020 as part of the CDA.21
¶5

Under § 230, a provider of an interactive computer service cannot be held liable for publishing or

distributing a defamatory statement made by another party22 as long as the service provider did not assist in
the creation or development of the statement.23 Specifically, § 230 states that “no provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.” The statute defines an “interactive computer service” as “any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server.”24 Interactive computer services include online bookstores,25 online auctions,26
and online bulletin boards.27 In addition, an “information content provider” is “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet
or any other interactive computer service.”28
¶6

nature.

Congress also enacted § 230 to promote the development of the Internet and to preserve its unique
29

The Internet is unique from other communication services because it enables individuals from

around the world to place, or post, information onto interactive computer services and to quickly receive
responses to that information from previously unknown persons. Information posting services include, but
are not limited to, email listservs30 and online bulletin boards. Traditional media are unable to facilitate this
same degree of collaboration and development of ideas.
¶7

In Batzel v. Smith, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a provider of a website or

listserv can be immune from publisher liability.31 In Batzel, a Mr. Cremers operated a website and listserv
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that distributed information about museum security and stolen art.32 One day Cremers received an email from
a Mr. Smith stating that Smith suspected that paintings located in the house of a Ms. Batzel were stolen.33
The email requested guidance on how to report the stolen art.34 Cremers selected Smith’s email, made minor
edits, placed the email in an electronic newsletter, and distributed the newsletter via the listserv.35 Soon
thereafter, Batzel sued Cremers and Smith claiming that Smith’s statements were false and harmful to her
reputation.36
¶8

The court of appeal’s analysis of Cremer’s actions turned on whether Cremer’s act of selecting and

editing the email made him a co-developer of the statements.37 The statements could not be considered to be
“information provided by another information content provider” if Cremers was a co-developer.38 The court
reasoned that Cremers was not a co-developer because editing and selecting content is part of the normal
duties of a publisher, and, if the CDA frees publishers from liability, then Cremers’ actions as a publisher
could not also make him ineligible for immunity.39 In addition, the court stated that Cremers is only immune
from liability if Smith intended Cremers to publish the email.40 Lastly, the court acknowledged that the CDA
does not require a provider of an interactive computer service to remove a statement from its service even
after the injured party informs the service provider that the statement is defamatory.41
¶9

Judge Gould dissented from the majority’s opinion and argued that Congress did not intend the statute

to protect rumors and falsehoods.42 Gould postulated that the CDA should be interpreted to endow a provider
on an interactive computer service with immunity from liability only if the service provider does not take an
active role in selecting the statement for publication.43 However, Gould continued, if the service provider
takes an active role in selecting the statement, the statement is no longer information provided by another
party, and the service provider is liable.44 The majority implied that Gould’s rule had merit, but stated that the
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dissent did not have any statutory backing for its opinion.45 The majority’s holding in Batzel is consistent
with the opinions of other courts.46

BRINGING THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IN LINE WITH SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
¶10

The common law tort of defamation and the CDA are inherently based on policy decisions. The tort

of defamation signifies that avenging and reducing the harm caused to individuals by defamatory statements
is worth some limitations on free speech.47 The CDA implies that avenging and reducing the harm from
electronic defamatory statements is not worth the risk of limiting the unique nature of the Internet and the risk
of deterring providers of interactive computer services from voluntarily regulating objectionable material.48
However, the CDA policy decision is based on the state of the Internet in 1996. Today, the Internet is used by
140 million American adults49 and is a valuable research and educational tool. In fact, a defamatory statement
made on the Internet will likely cause the same, if not more, harm as a similar statement made in a traditional
information service because of the number of people who could potentially read the statement.50 Therefore, in
2003, the 1996 balance between the harm caused by electronic defamatory statements and the goals of the
CDA is at best suspect.
¶11

The CDA would be a sound policy if it protected individuals from electronic defamatory statements,

protected the unique nature of the Internet, and protected a service provider’s ability to voluntarily edit
objectionable material. It is imperative that an amended statute does not protect individuals at the expense of
the original objectives of the CDA because such a statute would create the very situation feared by the 1996
lawmakers. All three policy objectives would be accomplished if the CDA included a broad definition of
“development” and a “take-down and put-back” provision.

45

See id. at 1032. Compare with Blumenthal v. Drudge, where the court made a policy argument similar to the
dissent’s argument in Batzel. However, the court did apply the argument because the argument did not comply with
the language of the CDA. 992 F. Supp. 44, 51-52 (D.D.C. 1998).
46
Ben Ezra, Weistein, and Co. v. America Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (“By deleting the
symbols, however, Defendant simply made the data unavailable and did not develop or create the stock quotation
information displayed.); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52 (“But Congress has made a different policy choice by
providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making
available content prepared by others.”); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332-33 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Once
a computer service provider receives notice of a potentially defamatory posting, it is thrust into the role of a
traditional publisher. The computer service provider must decide whether to publish, edit or withdraw the posting.
In this respect, [the defendant] is assuming the role for which § 230 specifically proscribes liability—the publisher’s
role.”).
47
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558.
48
See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b), (c)(1).
49
Harris Interactive, supra note 5, at tbl. 4.
50
See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for
Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 587-88 (2001) (“This means that for victims of those statements that are
found to be defamatory, or would be adjudicated, the injury can be extremely large in terms of how many people
viewed the defamation and likely responded to it by reducing their opinion of the victim.”).

1. Publisher Liability and a Definition of Development
¶12

Under the current CDA, a provider of an interactive computer service is immune from liability for

publishing a defamatory statement made by another party if the service provider was not a co-developer of the
statement. The CDA does not define what actions constitute development, but the courts have held that
actively selecting a statement for publication is not enough to qualify the service provider as a co-developer of
the statement.51 This discrepancy between e-providers and traditional providers would not exist if the CDA
included a broad definition of “development,” such as:
A provider of an interactive computer service is considered to have
participated in the development of “information provided by another
information content provider” if the service provider actively selected the
information for publication. The interactive service provider is not
considered to have actively selected the information if the service provider
only took actions consistent with § 230 (c)(2)(A).52
Under this definition, a provider of an interactive computer service is subject to publisher liability if it posts
information that it specifically selected for publication, but is not subject to liability if it posts all the non
objectionable material it receives. For example, a provider of a listserv that reviews all emails sent to the
listserv and posts all the non objectionable messages, or all the messages minus the objectionable text, is
immune from publisher liability. However, the same service provider is not immune from liability if it only
posts the messages it believes to be relevant.
¶13

Inserting this definition of development into the CDA preserves the original objectives of the statute

and is a first step to protecting individuals from electronic defamatory statements. First, the definition
preserves a service provider’s ability to voluntarily remove objectionable material from its service. The
service provider is not considered to be a co-developer of “information provided by another information
content provider” if the service provider’s only selection criteria is that the information does not contain
objectionable material.
¶14

Second, the definition does not stifle the unique nature of the Internet because it does not create an

incentive for the service provider to discontinue its information posting service. The service provider only
incurs liability if it limits the non objectionable material available on its service, or, in other words, the service
provider only incurs liability if it turns its posting service into an online newsletter or quasi-newspaper. There
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is nothing inherently unique about a high-speed newspaper that would justify the high-speed newspaper being
protected from publisher liability when a traditional newspaper would not be protected.53
¶15

Third, the definition of development subjects the service provider to the common law tort of

defamation if the service provider selects and publishes a defamatory statement made by another party.
However, the definition does not require the service provider to retract the statement once the service provider
knows the statement is false. Therefore, inserting the definition of development into the CDA is only the first
step in bringing the statute completely in line with sound public policy.
¶16

There are two arguments against inserting the definition of development into the CDA. The first

argument is that the CDA should not be altered because the Internet allows an individual harmed by an
electronic defamatory statement to rebut the statement in the same forum. This argument is misguided for
three reasons. First, the current CDA does not require a provider of an interactive computer service to post a
rebuttal or retraction to a defamatory statement. Second, not all interactive computer services allow the
injured individual to rebut the defamatory statement in the same forum. For example, in Batzel, Batzel could
not directly place a rebuttal in Cremer’s electronic newsletter because the content of the newsletter was
controlled solely by Cremers.54 Third, assuming the injured individual is able to post a rebuttal, the current
CDA does not provide the injured party with any means of obtaining monetary damages.
¶17

The second argument against inserting the definition is that the Internet provides an inexpensive

opportunity for a lay person to electronically publish information and that any amendment to the CDA might
stifle this ability. This argument is also misguided because the definition of development does not change the
cost of online publishing, such as, the price of web space or the price of creating a web page. The definition
only requires any provider of an interactive computer services to meet minimal common law standards.

2. Distributor Liability and a Take-Down and Put-Back Provision
¶18

By itself, the definition of development does not adequately protect individuals from electronic

defamatory statements because the definition does not hold a provider of an interactive computer service
liable for refusing to remove a statement from its service that it knows to be defamatory.55 In 2000, Congress
faced a similar problem with copyrights and solved it by enacting a “take-down and put-back” provision56 as
part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).57 The DCMA take-down and put-back provision
subjects an online service provider to distributor liability for failing to remove defamatory material posted by
another party from its service if the service provider knows, or has been sufficiently notified, that the material
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infringes a third party’s copyright.58 In addition, the provision places the burden of investigating the validity
of a copyright infringement claim on the injured party and the party that posted the material.59
¶19

If the DCMA take-down and put-back provision was adapted to the CDA, a provider of an interactive

computer service would be subjected to distributor liability if it had actual knowledge that a statement is
defamatory, had knowledge of facts which make the defamatory nature of a statement apparent, received
financial benefit directly from a defamatory statement, or was notified that a statement is defamatory, and did
not remove the statement from its service.60 The service provider is considered to know that a statement is
defamatory if a reasonable person in the service provider’s position would conclude that it is apparent that the
statement is defamatory.61 In addition, the service provider is only considered to be notified of the existence
of a defamatory statement if the injured party submits a formal written notification62 to the service provider.63
The service provider may file a lawsuit to recoup any expenses incurred as the result of a fraudulent statement
made within the notification.64
¶20

Upon receiving a valid notification, the service provider retains its immunity if it adheres to a set of

formal procedures. The service provider must first inform the party that provided the statement that the
statement will be removed from the service.65 The service provider is only required to take reasonable steps
to contact the content provider, such as, sending an email to the address that was connected to the original
posting.66 The content provider may submit a counter notice declaring that the statement is not defamatory.67
If he or she submits a counter notice, the service provider must put the disputed statement back onto the
interactive computer service within ten to fourteen business days.68 The injured party may then seek an
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injunction declaring that the statement is defamatory and that it must be removed.69 The service provider is
not involved in the court proceedings, but must comply with the order.70
¶21

The proposed CDA take-down and put-back provision preserves the original objectives of the CDA

and is the second step to protecting individuals from electronic defamatory statements. First, the take-down
and put-back provision imposes liability only if a provider of an interactive computer service purposefully
leaves a defamatory statement on its service, without first following the prescribed protocol. The service
provider’s ability to voluntarily remove objectionable material from its service is not affected.
¶22

Second, the provision does not stifle the unique nature of the Internet because the provision does not

make it more economically efficient for a service provider to alter its service. A generic distributor liability
provision could stifle the unique nature of the Internet.71 If the service provider is forced to incur significant
expenses in order to adequately investigate whether a statement is defamatory, the service provider may find
it more efficient to automatically discard every disputed statement,72 or to stop providing the service all
together.73 However, the take-down and put back provision places the majority of the investigation costs on
the injured party and the content provider. The service provider does not incur investigation costs if it knows
that the statement is defamatory because there is nothing to investigate. In addition, if the service provider is
notified that a statement might be defamatory, the service provider’s only responsibility is to take-down and
put-back the statement according to the formal procedure. Also, the service provider can recover any costs
associated with a fraudulent notification. Lastly, in the case of an injunction, the service provider’s only
responsibility is to remove the statement if so ordered. The service provider will likely find it economically
advantageous to internalize these minimal transaction costs because it will be driven by market forces to
provide a competitive information posting service.
¶23

Third, the take-down and put back-provision protects individuals from electronic defamatory

statements. The provision imposes liability on a service provider if it refuses to remove a statement from its
service that it knows to be defamatory or that it has been notified could be defamatory.

CONCLUSION
¶24

The CDA should be amended to include a broad definition of “development” and a “take-down and

put-back” provision. Under the current CDA, a provider of an interactive computer service may select and
publish a defamatory statement made by another party and may refuse to remove the statement from its
69
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service even if the service provider knows that the statement is false. Conversely, a provider of a traditional
information service is liable if it publishes or distributes defamatory material. This distinction between eproviders and traditional providers is suspect because a defamatory statement published over the Internet has
as much, if not more, potential for harm as a statement published over a traditional media.
¶25

The CDA would be in line with sound public policy if it included the proposed definition of

development and the take-down and put-back provision. The definition of development would subject a
provider of an interactive computer service to publisher liability if the service provider actively selected the
information posted on its service. The take-down and put-back provision would subject the service provider
to distributor liability if it refused to remove a statement from its service which it knew to be defamatory or
for which an injured party had submitted a formal notification. In addition, the amended CDA would
preserve the unique nature of the Internet and would not deter service providers from voluntarily regulating
objectionable material.
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